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SUPPLYING HUMAN BODY PARTS:
A JEWISH LAW PERSPECTIVE
Steven H. Resnicoff*
INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses two related, but distinct, questions: (1)
whether, under Jewish law, it is ethical for someone to buy or sell
precious body parts; and (2) whether, given Jewish law's perspectives,
it would be appropriate for the United States to adopt a distribution
system that would give preference to people who volunteer to be pro-
spective donors.
Before endeavoring to answer the first question, however, it is use-
ful to ask why one might care what Jewish law has to say on these
matters. Three principal groups of people should explore Jewish law's
responses to organ transplantation. First are those who seek to abide
by Jewish law and, therefore, must know its rules. Second are individ-
uals who respect Jewish law, who are curious about it, and who might
be persuaded by its teachings. Third are those who, even if they
neither follow nor respect Jewish law, are nonetheless concerned lest
secular law unnecessarily, and painfully, impinge upon the religious
values of those who do. These people must know what Jewish law
prescribes to ensure that secular law is carefully circumscribed to
avoid any needless conflict.
Those falling within the first group-those already committed to
Jewish law-might be interested not only in a discussion of the appli-
cable Jewish law rules but also in a detailed, painstaking demonstra-
tion, drawing on a plethora of sources, of how these rules are derived.
After all, Jewish law is a legal system, with all of the elements of such
a system, including primary and secondary sources of law, hierarchies
of literary and human authorities, maxims of legal interpretation, and
particularized processes for resolving tension between and among ap-
parently conflicting legal principles. At one time, Jewish law even had
* Professor, DePaul University College of Law; J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Princeton Uni-
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an institution, the Great Court (the Sanhedrin ha-Gadol) that could
promulgate definitive pronouncements regarding matters to which
lower authorities disagreed.' Nevertheless, various historical and soci-
ological developments caused that institution to cease functioning ap-
proximately 1,600 years ago.2 I assume that most readers of this
Article fall into the second or third group. Consequently, Part II,
while eschewing the nuances of Jewish law, briefly describes the doc-
trines that are most relevant to our discussion. Part III discusses how
these doctrines interact to provide answers as to whether precious
body parts may be sold. Part IV explores whether, from a Jewish law
perspective, it is appropriate for the United States to adopt a distribu-
tion system that prefers, as donees, those who volunteer as prospec-
tive donors. It explains that secular law, relying on a definition of
death that is rejected by a large number of Jewish law authorities, har-
vests body parts from, and in the process kills, people who, according
to such Jewish law authorities, are still alive. Given that Jewish law
does not permit individuals to have their lives shortened by volunteer-
ing for such procedures, a distribution system that prefers such volun-
teers would unfairly discriminate against Jews based on their religious
beliefs and practices.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPALLY RELEVANT
JEWISH LAW DOCTRINES
Many Jewish law duties are relevant to an analysis of Jewish law's
view regarding the transfer of precious body parts. The most promi-
nent include the following:
1. The duty to preserve human life;3
2. The duty to preserve one's own health;4
1. ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA (Keterr Publishing Co., CD Version 1.0 (1997)) (search
"Sanhedrin").
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 73a, translated in BASIL F. HERRING, JEWISH
ETHICS AND HALAKHAH FOR OUR TIME 71 (1984) ("How do we know that if one sees his fellow
drowning in a river, or a wild animal mauling him, or robbers attacking him, one must save him?
Therefore it is said, 'neither shalt thou stand idly by the blood of thy neighbor' (Lev.
19:16) .. "); J. DAVID BLEICH, JUDAISM AND HEALING 22 (1981) ("The value with which
human life is regarded in the Jewish tradition is maximized far beyond the value placed upon
human life in the Christian tradition or in Anglo-Saxon common law."). See also 2 HERRING,
supra, at 10-17 (1989); IMMANUEL JAKOBOVITS, JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS 45-58 (1959); Steven
H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law Perspectives on Suicide and Physician-Assisted Dying, 13 J.L. & RELIG-
ION 289, 314-16 (1998-1999).
4. Resnicoff, supra note 3, at 296-301. See also SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 427:9-10.
The Shulhan Arukh, authored by Rabbi Yosef Caro in the sixteenth century, is largely regarded
as the most authoritative code of Jewish law. See, e.g., ARYEH KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF
JEWISH THOUGHT 240 (1979). ("Because of the near universal acceptance of the Shulchan
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3. The duty not to commit suicide;5
4. The duty not to murder anyone-even if the person expresses
the desire to die;6
5. The requirement not to desecrate, and not to profit from, a ca-
daver;7 and
6. The duty to refrain from an act that might violate biblical law,
even if the violation is uncertain. 8
A. The Duty to Preseri'e Human Life
Jewish law regards each human life as supremely valuable. In dis-
cussing the creation of Adam, the first human being, the Talmud
explains:
[O]nly a single human being was created in the world [at first], to
teach that if any person has caused a single soul to perish, Scripture
regards him as if he had caused an entire world to perish; and if any
human being saves a single soul, Scripture regards him as if he had
saved an entire world.9
Unlike common law, Jewish law imposes an affirmative duty to save a
person's life through one's direct intervention or through the use of
one's resources. The clearest biblical basis for this rule is the verse
that states, "Do not stand idly by your fellow's blood."10 If necessary
to rescue a person, one must violate every provision of Jewish law
except for those relating to immoral sexual acts, idolatry, or murder. 1
The cherished status of human life is independent of secular con-
cerns with the supposed "quality of life." As Rabbi Shlomo Zalman
Auerbach (1910-1995) wrote:
We have no yardstick to measure the value and importance of life,
even in terms of Torah and the commandments, for we violate the
Sabbath even for an aged invalid afflicted with boils, even though
he is deaf and dumb and completely insane, and even though he is
Arukh, its decisions are considered binding, unless otherwise indicated by the leading authorities
of succeeding generations.").
5. Resnicoff, supra note 3, at 301-12; see also BLEICH, supra note 3, at 158-61.
6. Resnicoff, supra note 3, at 312-14; see also 2 ABRAHAM S. ABRAHAM, NISHMAT AVRAHAM
319-25 (Abraham S. Abraham trans., 2003) (citing views of various leading Jewish law authori-
tics); BLEICH-, su.pra nate 3, at 134- 45; jAKOEOX'iT ura e 3,t2576
7. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Avodah Zarah 29b. See also 2 HERRING, supra note 3, at
110-12.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 38-39.
9. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 37a, translated in J. David Bleich, Life as an Intrinsic
Rather Than Instrumental Good: The "Spiritual" Case Against Euthanasia, 9 ISSUEs L. & MED.
139, 140 (1993).
10. Leviticus 19:16.
11. SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh De'ah 195:3, 157:1; MAIMONIDES (1138-1204), MISHNEH To-
RAH, Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 5:1.
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incapable of performing any of the commandments and his life
seems merely a burden and great suffering to his family and pre-
vents them from studying Torah and performing commandments-
and even if, in addition to their great anguish, his family becomes
more and more impoverished. Even so, it is a duty for the leaders
of the Jewish nation to be involved in saving him and in violating
the Sabbath [if necessary to do so].12
Nor, as a general matter, does the importance of human life depend
on its anticipated length. Every instant of life is of transcendental
value. 13 Indeed, human life is so sacred that one must attempt a res-
cue at the cost of transgressing other obligations, even if there is only
a slight chance that the rescue will be successful. 14
Jewish law imposes parameters on the burden one must endure in
the fulfillment of a commandment, even regarding this commandment
to rescue others. Although there is some disagreement among the au-
thorities, the majority view seems to be that one must exhaust up to
all of one's resources in order to save another person's life.15
12. SHLOMO ZALMAN AUERBACH, MINHAT SHLOMO 91. Similarly, even if a person suffers so
much that he tries to commit suicide, normative Jewish law requires that others try to save him,
regardless of whether they must violate the Sabbath laws to do so. See, e.g., MOSHE FEINSTEIN
(1895-1986), IGGEROT MOSHE, Yoreh De'ah 11:174(3), Yoreh De'ah 111:90; YITZHAK HERZOG
(1888-1959), HEIKHAL YITZHAK, Even ha-Ezer 1:3; ELIEZER WALDENBURG (b. 1917), TzITz
ELIEZER VIII:15, Kuntras Mechivat Nefesh, chapter IV, XVII, Kuntras Refuah b'Shabbat, chap-
ter 11 (citing authorities); OVADIAH YOSEF (b. 1920), YABBIA OMER VIII, Orah Hayyim 37
(citing authorities); MENASHE KLEIN (b. 1925), MISHNE HALACHOTH VIII:56, IX:399.
13. See 2 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 320 (quoting the views of various authorities:
"The Gesher HaChaim explains that since there is neither a measure nor a boundary to
the worth of a life, one cannot differentiate between a tiny fraction of life and a period
one hundred million times greater .... Ray [Immanuel] Jakobovitz . . . writes: The
worth of a person's life is immeasurable and therefore cannot be divided; each and
every fraction of it is infinite.")
See also BLEICH, supra note 3; Resnicoff, supra note 3, at 290-96.
14. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 84a; see also SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh De'ah 195:3,
157:1; MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Foundations of the Torah 5:1; Resnicoff, supra note 3, at
315.
15. The general rule is that to fulfill a positive or active commandment, one must use up to
twenty percent of one's wealth, but to avoid transgressing a negative or passive commandment,
one must exhaust up to all of one's wealth. There is, however, disagreement as to how to charac-
terize the duty "not to stand idly by." Although it is phrased as a negative commandment, its
effect is to command action. See generally RABBI ABRAHAM Zvi HIRSCH EISENSTADT
(1813-1868), PinTai TESHUVAH, Yoreh De'ah 157:4 (citing authorities); 3 ABRAHAM, supra note
6, at 309-11 (2004) (citing authorities). Nevertheless, most authorities seem to characterize it as
a negative commandment. See, e.g., FEINSTEIN, supra note 12; RABBI Zvi HIRSCH SHAPIRA
(1893-1937), DARKEi TESHUVA, Yoreh De'ah 157:57.
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B. The Duty to Preserve One's Own Health
Jewish law demands that a person take care of his or her health.' 6
The Talmud 17 seems to cite two explicit biblical passages, "Beware for
yourself and greatly beware for your soul"'18 and "But you shall
greatly beware for your souls," 19 as the basis for this duty.20 Conse-
quently, many major Jewish law authorities state that these verses re-
quire that a person avoid recklessly dangerous activities and
affirmatively take steps to safeguard his or her health.21 Moreover, if
one's very life is at risk, then the duty to preserve life, discussed
above, is also triggered.
C. The Duty Not to Commit Murder
The biblical rule, "Thou shalt not murder," is clear.22 One may not
kill even to save one's own life.23 Thus, the Talmud reports that a
person went to the sage named Rava, and told him: "Mari Deroi told
me, 'Go kill Ploni and, if you do not, I'll kill you.' ... [Rava] told him,
'Let him kill you, but you may not kill [Ploni]."'24 Nor would it mat-
ter if Levi were physically handicapped, mentally deranged, terminally
ill, comatose, or had only moments left to live. One may not rescue
oneself by hastening another's death.25
Indeed, as a general rule, one may not commit murder, or even turn
someone over to be killed by others, in order to save many lives. The
Tosefta 26 states: "When heathens say to a group of Jews, 'give us one
16. See, e.g., SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 427:9-10; see also 3 ABRAHAM, supra note 6,
at 322-25; MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Deot 4:1.
17. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Berakhot 32b.
18. Deuteronomy 4:9.
19. Id. at 4:15.
20. Although the context of these verses suggests that they apply to the protection of one's
spiritual health, the scope of these injunctions is not so narrowly limited. See RABBI BORUCH
HALEVI EPSTEIN (1860-1941), TORAH TEMIMAH, Comment to Deuteronomy 4:9. See generally
Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law: Duties of the Intellect, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 386, 387 (2003)
("Jewish law is not a literalist tradition" but instead relies on authoritative interpretations of the
texts).
21. See, e.g., MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Rotzeah 11:4; R. JOSEPH BEN MOSES
BABAD (1800-1874/5), MINHAT HINNUKH, Commandment 546. Various other doctrinal sources
are also mentioned. See, e.g., RARRI MFNAC-HFM Si AP, SMOKING AND DAMAGFs TO HFAI.TH IN
THE HALACHAH 3-16 (1990); Resnicoff, supra note 3, at 297.
22. Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17.
23. MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 5:1.
24. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Pesahim 25b.
25. See, e.g., BABAD, supra note 21, Commandment 34 (explaining that the prohibition against
murder applies equally to someone with only a moment to live and someone with many years to
live); MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Rozeah u'Shemirat ha-Nefesh 2:7 ("There is no
difference between one who kills a healthy person or who kills person who is ill and dying.. .
26. See ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 1 (search "Tosefta").
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of your group and we will kill him, and if not, we will kill you all['] all
must be killed rather than surrendering even one Jew."'27
D. The Duty Not to Commit Suicide
Although committing suicide would clearly transgress the duties to
preserve one's health and human life and would violate the prohibi-
tion against murder, many authorities find an additional, specific pro-
scription against suicide from the verse, "The blood of your lives will I
require. '28 Jewish law regards suicide as especially opprobrious for
many reasons.29 First, suicide constitutes a rejection of the duty to
cope successfully with the religious challenges of this world and the
commandment to "be holy."' 30 Second, suicide committed out of de-
spair reflects a lack of trust in God's ability to remedy one's predica-
ment or God's authority to impose punishment for one's
transgressions. 31 Third, suicide deprives a person of valuable opportu-
nities that are available only while one is alive, including the chance to
repent for past sins.32 Fourth, although under Jewish law death itself
can effect expiation for a person's past sins, death through suicide
adds yet an additional sin. 33
E. The Duty to Bury a Body, Not to Desecrate or Profit From It
The body of a person who is executed for having committed a capi-
tal offense is thereafter briefly hung on a tree.34 Nonetheless, an ex-
plicit biblical verse forbids leaving the body on the tree overnight,
requiring instead that it be buried on the same day as the execution.35
Why? Because Jewish law posits that the dignity of human life re-
quires that the human body, even the body of an executed criminal,
27. TOSEFTA, Terumot 7:20, translated in Nahum Rakover, The One vs. the Many in Life and
Death Situations, in 8 JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES 129, 130 (E.A. Goldman ed., 1996).
28. Genesis 9:5. See, e.g., MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Rotzeah u"Shemirat Nefesh
2:3; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shevuot 28a; BABAD, supra note 21. Some authorities disagree,
however, maintaining that suicide falls within the prohibition against murder found in Exodus
20:13. See J. David Bleich, Survey of Recent Halakhik Periodical Literature: Treatment of the
Terminally Ill, 30 TRADITION 51, 79-80 n.12 (1996) (citing this view).
29. For a longer, and more detailed, discussion of the Jewish view regarding suicide, see
Resnicoff, supra note 3, at 301-12.
30. Leviticus 19:2.
31. RABBI YEHIEL MICHOEL TUKAZINSKY (1871-1955), GESHER HA-HAYYIM I, at 269-70.
32. See generally Fred Rosner, Suicide in Jewish Law, in JEWISH BIOETHICS 317, 327 (Fred
Rosner & J. David Bleich eds., 1979).
33. Id. at 326. See also MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Teshuva 1:4, 2:1.
34. Deuteronomy 21:22. See ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 1 (search "Capital
Punishment").
35. Deuteronomy 21:23.
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not be subjected to unnecessary indignity.36 Moreover, Jewish law re-
quires a speedy burial for all those who die37 and prohibits one from
utilizing a cadaver for personal profit.38
F. The Duty to Refrain From an Act That Might Violate Biblical
Law, Even if the Violation Is Uncertain
As already noted, murder is biblically forbidden. But what if it is
uncertain whether a particular act will kill someone? Is carrying out
the act biblically prohibited, or does it depend on whether the act ac-
tually causes someone's death?
Jewish law has a general rule that deals with situations in which a
particular act may or may not violate Jewish law. If the prohibition at
stake is biblical in nature, rather than one that was rabbinically
promulgated, then Jewish law rules stringently; it forbids the act even
if it is uncertain whether the act will violate the prohibition.39 Be-
cause the prohibition against murder is biblical, even if it is uncertain
whether a particular act will constitute murder, the act is forbidden.40
As will be discussed in Part IV, secular law, relying on the concept
of "brain death," permits the harvesting of body parts from persons
who, according to perhaps the majority of the most influential Jewish
law authorities, are either certainly or at least possibly alive. 41 As a
result of the harvesting procedures, however, such patients defini-
36. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 47a (prohibition against "Nivul ha-Met"). See generally
Reuven Fink, Halachic Aspects of Organ Transplantation, 5 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. Soc'V 45,
46-47 (1983).
37. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 46a. See Fink, supra note 36, at 48-49.
38. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Avodah Zarah 29b. See Fink supra note 36, at 47-48.
39. See, e.g., MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Mikvaot 8:6; YOM Tov VIDAL OF
TOLOSA (second half of the fourteenth century), MAGGID MISHNEH, Hilkhot Shabbat 27:3. See
also Michael J. Broyde & Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business Structures: The
Corporate Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1685, 1816 (1997).
40. See, e.g., 2 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 319.
41. See, e.g., Yitzchok A. Breitowitz. The Brain Death Controversy in Jewish Law, http://
jlaw.com/Articles/brain.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). As noted by Rabbi Breitowitz,
.. . .. [o ,,,; ....... th7t1,] P t. Vskrnel irel] (other
than the Chief Rabbinate) have unequivocally repudiated the concept of death based
on neurological or respiratory criteria. Of special significance are letters signed by R.
Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Yosef Elyashiv, widely acknowledged as the leading
poskim in Eretz Yisroel (if not the world), stating that removal of organs from a donor
whose heart is beating and whose entire brain including the brain-stem is not function-
ing at all is prohibited and involves the taking of life. Unfortunately, these very brief
communications do not indicate if the psak [ruling] is based on vadei (certainty) or
safeik (doubt) ....
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also infra text accompanying notes 68-71.
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tively die. Consequently, according to these authorities, such proce-
dures are forbidden by the prohibition against murder. 42
III. DOES JEWISH LAW PERMIT THE SALE OF PRECIOUS
BODY PARTS?
Whether Jewish law permits the sale of precious body parts involves
two questions. First, does Jewish law permit the transfer of body
parts? Second, does Jewish law permit the transferor to be paid for
those body parts? Each question will be examined separately.
A. May Precious Body Parts Be Transferred?
1. Inter Vivos Transfers
The first four doctrines discussed in Part II interact so as to permit
the transfer of body parts from living donors in some instances and to
proscribe them in others. The easiest case for permitting such a trans-
fer would be if it were necessary to save another person's life and it
could be accomplished without any detrimental effect on the donor.
Under such circumstances, the duty to preserve Jewish life would
likely require the transfer, and none of the other three doctrines
would be relevant. Nevertheless, a transfer generally does entail some
detrimental effect on the transferor, and this fact requires an evalua-
tion not only of the scope of the obligation to rescue but also of the
other three doctrines.
The issue of giving up a precious body part to save another person's
life was not introduced into Jewish law literature by the modern medi-
cal breakthroughs that have made life-saving organ transfers possible.
Indeed, the seminal question did not involve the transfer of a body
part but rather its loss. The issue arose as a result of a cruel choice
imposed upon a Jew by a sadistic, non-Jewish despot. 43 Perhaps the
earliest, extant rabbinic analysis was authored by Rabbi Menachem
Recanati, a late thirteenth-century, early fourteenth-century Italian
sage. 44 He considered a situation in which a feudal ruler demanded
that a particular Jew allow the amputation of one of his "nonessential"
limbs, such as a hand or a foot.45 If the Jew refused, the tyrant would
kill another Jew in the community. Employing an a fortiori argument,
Recanati ruled that the first Jew must submit to the amputation in
42. See Breitowitz, supra note 41.
43. See J. David Bleich, Compelling Tissue Donations, 27 TRADITION 3, 61 (1993).
44. See THE RiSHONIM 194 (Hersh Goldwurm ed., 2d ed. 2001).
45. MENACHEM RECANATI, RECANATI, Responsa 470.
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order to save the other person's life.46 Specifically, he noted that Jew-
ish law does not permit a person to violate the Sabbath laws in order
to save an unessential limb.47 Thus, one "sacrifices" a limb to pre-
serve the Sabbath. Yet Jewish law requires a person to violate the
Sabbath to save a life.48 Consequently, he argued, one must sacrifice a
limb to save a life.49
Others, such as Rabbi David ibn Zimra, known as the Radbaz,
(1480-1573), who served for over forty years as the Chief Rabbi of
Egypt,50 and Rabbi Shabtai HaKohen, known as the Shakh,
(1622-1663), a leading Lithuanian authority,51 disagreed with Re-
canati, but their respective reasons are arguably ambiguous. 52 Rabbi
Moshe Feinstein (1895-1986), one of the most influential Jewish law
authorities of the twentieth century, explained-and endorsed-the
Shakh's reasoning. 53 He said that the duty not to stand idly by when
one could rescue another is a negative commandment compelling one
to exhaust up to all of one's wealth in effectuating a rescue.54 The
question, reasoned Feinstein, is whether loss of a limb constitutes a
greater sacrifice than the loss of all of one's money.55 If it does, fulfill-
ment of the commandment does not require one to bear it.56 Inas-
much as no Talmudic sources suggest that one would have to endure
the loss of a limb-and, indeed, they may suggest the contrary-he
reasoned that a person is not obligated to sacrifice a limb to save
someone else's life.57
Another consideration might also prevent a person from being re-
quired to sacrifice a body part to save another person. Suppose there
are multiple people who could serve as effective donors for the one
person who needs a body part. If so, then none of these prospective
donors may be personally required to volunteer as the donor. Instead,
46. Id.
47. Id. See also 1 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 203 (2000); SHULHAN ARUKH, Oreh Hayyim
328:17.
48. 2 KAPLAN, supra note 4, at 39 (Abraham Sutton ed., 1992); SHULHAN ARUKH, Oreh
Hayyim 328:2; see also 1 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 185; RECANATI, supra note 45.
49. RECANTI, supra note 45.
50. THE EARLY ACHARONIM 79-81 (Hersh Goldwurm ed., 1989).
51. Id. at C UY.
52. See 3 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 313 (discussing the views of Recanati, Radbaz, and
Shakh); see also SHAKH, COMMENTARY TO SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh De'ah 157, sif koton 3.
53. FEINSTEIN, supra note 12, Yoreh De'ah 11:174(4).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. See generally J. DAVID BLEICH, 4 CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 275-79
(1995) (citing authorities).
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there might be only a communal obligation to try to ensure that one of
them steps forward.5 8
But Jewish law addresses not only that which is required or pro-
scribed. It also provides guidance as to what is favored or disfavored.
Even most of the authorities who rule that there is no duty to lose a
limb in order to save someone else's life maintain that one may volun-
tarily make such a sacrifice and that whoever does so is indeed
praiseworthy. 59
What about situations which do not require loss of a limb, but in-
stead involve risk to the rescuer's own life? Where the risk is minimal,
Jewish law may in fact obligate one to undertake the rescue.6° Ac-
cordingly, some authorities rule that one must make donations of
blood or skin when necessary to save someone's life.61 At least one
contemporary authority, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef (b. 1920), a former Is-
raeli Chief Rabbi, suggested that one ought to make a renal donation
in order to save someone's life.62 The threat to life need not be immi-
nent. Even if a recipient has the use of a dialyzer, a kidney transfer is
deemed life-saving if it statistically increases the recipient's life expec-
tancy. 63 Most authorities, however, rule that although making such a
donation is meritorious, it is not required.64
Yet, there is a limit to such altruism. According to most Jewish law
authorities, one may not generally give up one's life to save the life of
someone else.65 One does not promote human life by trading his or
her life to save the life of another. Consequently, if it is more likely
58. Id.
59. Id. at 279-81 (citing authorities).
60. Id. at 277 n.12 ("Rabbi Unterman suggests that, in making a decision, the potential rescuer
should ask himself if he would incur the identical danger in order to rescue a cherished posses-
sion. If yes, he should cherish the life of his fellow equally and accept the danger."). See also
RABBI YEHIEL MICHAL HALEVI (1829-1908), ARUKH HA-SHULHAN, Hoshen Mishpat 426:4 (in
deciding whether to rescue another, one should not be overly careful about one's own safety).
61. See, e.g., RABBI MOSHE MEISELMAN, HALAKHAH u-REFU'AH 11:118 (donations of blood
and skin are required); RABBI SHMUEL HALEVI WOSNER, SHEVET HA-LEVI V:119 (blood dona-
tions are obligatory). But see Tzirz ELIEZER XIII:101(6) (blood donations are not obligatory).
See generally AVRAHAM STEINBERG, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS 1096, 1103
nn.68-69 (Fred Rosner trans., 2003); see also 2 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 345-47.
62. OVADIAH YOSEF, YEHAVEH DA'AT 111:84. See STEINBERG, supra note 61, at 1095 (con-
struing Yosefs position as requiring such a kidney donation).
63. See, e.g., BLEICH, supra note 3, at 132. Cf. 2 HERRING, supra note 3, at 97-98 (citing
authority permitting kidney transplantation if it provides a greater likelihood of survival). If the
use of dialysis was equally effective to preserve the patient's life, at least one authority would
forbid use of a cadaver organ. Id. at 118.
64. See STEINBERG, supra note 61, at 1095, 1103, nn.62-63 & 65.
65. See JAKOBOVITS, supra note 3, at 98; see also 2 HERRING, supra note 3, at 104. See gener-
ally 1 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 217-18; 2 ABRAHAM, supra note 6 at 345-46; 3 ABRAHAM,
supra note 6, at 313-17; Bleich, supra note 43, at 60-61.
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than not that the rescue will cost the rescuer his or her own life, then
the commandment to preserve one's own health and the injunction
against suicide take precedence, and the rescue is proscribed.66
2. Cadaveric Transfers
Theoretically, the alternative of cadaveric donations would avoid
conflict with the commandment to preserve one's own health and the
injunction against suicide. It would only involve the principle of pre-
serving human life (which would favor such donations) versus the spe-
cial rules regarding cadavers (which would seem to disfavor such
donations).
According to many authorities, where Jewish law perceives that ca-
daveric donations could save life, the importance of preserving human
life would trump the otherwise applicable rules regarding cadavers. 67
Support for this view is even stronger if the deceased had consented in
advance to such transfers.68 Consequently, as a matter of Jewish law,
such transfers might be required or, at least, permitted and praised.
There is disagreement, however, as to precisely what types of transfers
should be characterized as life-preserving. Thus although most au-
thorities believe that a corneal transplant to a person who is com-
pletely blind is permitted as life-preserving, some authorities would
not permit a transfer to a recipient who already has one functioning
eye. 69 Transfers for mere cosmetic purposes, except in cases in which
the recipient could thereby be saved from extreme psychological or
emotional distress, are similarly unlikely to be permitted.70
66. YOSEF, supra note 62.
67. See, e.g., STEINBERG, supra note 61, at 1096 (asserting that most authorities rule that a
transplant procedure to save life "waives" the prohibition against desecrating the dead). Moreo-
ver, there may also be technical reasons under Jewish law why one or more of the rules regard-
ing cadavers would simply not apply to the constructive transplantation of cadaveric body parts
for the purpose of saving lives. For example, the prohibition against benefitting from a cadaver
may be inapplicable to benefits obtained in unusual manners, such as the benefit derived from a
transplant. Id. Similarly, once a body part is transplanted, it may be deemed to be a live part of
the live donee, and any benefit obtained from it may be considered to be a benefit derived from
the living. Id. See also 2 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 342-45.
68. STEINBERG, supra note 61, at 1096-97. See also OVADIA YOSEF, YABBIA OMER III,
Yoreah De'ah 20, 21 (with prior consent of deceased, one can even transplant a cornea to a
donee who already has one functional eye). Cf Fink, supra note 36, at 52 n.19 (stating that most
rabbinic authorities would not permit cadaveric transplants without the prior consent of the
deceased).
69. See, e.g., RABBI UNTERMAN, SHEVET MI-YEHUDAH 313-22 (allowing cadaveric transplant
of corneas to donees who are blind in both eyes but not to those who still have one functioning
eye).
70. There is no Jewish law obligation to improve one's appearance that would override the
general rules regarding the need to bury a cadaver. See supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
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But even many supposedly cadaveric organ transfers that could
probably preserve a recipient's life are likely to be forbidden under
Jewish law. Why? The most coveted organs, such as the heart and
kidneys, rapidly deteriorate once the donor's heart stops beating. 71
The brain death definition is designed to enable physicians to treat
"donors" as dead before their hearts stop beating, even though, under
Jewish law, these donors may not yet be dead. If the donors are still
alive before the removal of the organs, surgery removing their organs
kills them. Consequently, such surgery violates the Jewish law against
murder. Even if, in a particular case, it is uncertain whether the donor
is alive at the time of the surgery, Jewish law's rule regarding uncer-
tainty, discussed at the end of Part II, prohibits the operation lest it
constitute murder.72 For similar reasons, Jewish law would not allow a
person to consent in advance to being a donor in such a situation,
because by doing so one would be guilty of causing his or her own
death.73
3. Criteria for Determining Death
But why would secular physicians take organs from other human
beings who might be alive? First, some commentators actually believe
in establishing priorities based on the "quality" of a person's life.74
They are therefore willing to allow physicians to cause the deaths of
people who they believe have a terribly inferior "quality of life" in
order to save the lives of others whose perceived quality of life is bet-
ter.75 Second, perhaps more importantly, those who want desperately
to save prospective transplant recipients but are unwilling to kill live
donors are legally, and perhaps morally, able to rely on a modern defi-
71. See Breitowitz, supra note 41.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
73. By enabling the physicians involved in the procedure to operate, thereby causing death,
the patient giving such consent might also violate Jewish law's rules against causing or assisting
others to sin. See generally Steven H. Resnicoff, Helping a Client Violate Jewish Law: A Jewish
Lawyer's Dilemma, in 10 JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES 191 (H.G. Sprecher ed., 2000).
74. See, e.g., David Randolph Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 850, 888 (1986) (identifying cognitive abilities as distinguishing "human" life from other life
forms, and proposing that the lack of such abilities should define human death so that "[n]o
longer will the law favor artificially maintaining someone in an inhuman state").
75. Robert D. Truog, Is It Time to Abandon Brain Death?, 27 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 29 (1997);
Robert Truog & Walter Robinson, Role of Brain Death and the Dead-Donor Rule in the Ethics of
Organ Transplantation, 31 CRITICAL CARE MED. 2391 (2003) (acknowledging that "brain dead"
patients are not really dead but arguing that it is nevertheless morally justified to take their vital
organs); 2 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 317-18 (citing views).
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nition of death, namely "brain death," which defines prospective do-
nors as dead.7 6
Although a rigorous analysis of the brain death definition is beyond
the purview of this paper, a brief discussion of it and of its relationship
to Jewish law is essential. First, secular law definitions of death are
not per se valid under Jewish law. What constitutes "death" is a mat-
ter of fundamental importance under Jewish law and is established by
Jewish law authorities based on Jewish law sources. Second, accord-
ing to many (and quite possibly most) major Israeli77 and American 78
Jewish law authorities, the brain death definition and standards, as
widely adopted and applied in the United States, do not conclusively
establish when someone is dead. According to these and other Jewish
law authorities, 79 most people who are secularly declared brain dead
are, under Jewish law, either definitely alive or at least possibly alive.
Consequently, operating on these persons to remove their vital or-
gans-even for the purpose of saving someone else's life-would be
absolutely forbidden. Even surgery on such patients to take some-
thing that might otherwise be considered nonessential, such as skin or
blood, would likely be forbidden because, given their precarious posi-
tions, any such procedure might be considered, under Jewish law, as
endangering their lives.80
76. See infra notes 86, 92 and accompanying text (explaining that the brain death standard was
intended to accomplish this result).
77. See 2 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 307-17 (surveying various views); BLEICH, supra note 57,
at 331-34; Breitowitz, supra note 41; see also J. DAVID BLEICH, TIME OF DEATH IN JEWISH LAW
144-45, 159 n.40, 177 (citing the views of Rabbis Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Yosef Shlomo Ely-
ashiv, Nathan Gestetner, Elazar Kahanow, Nisim Karelitz, Yitzhak Kulitz, Yehoshua Neuwirth,
Eleazar Shach, Moshe Sternburch, Eliezar Waldenburg, Yitzhak Weisz, and Shmuel Wosner).
Although the Israeli Chief Rabbinate Council permits liver transplants under certain circum-
stances, it is debatable as to whether this position involves approval of the brain death standard.
BLEICH, supra, at 143-48.
78. BLEICH, supra note 77, at 159 (citing Rabbis Isaac Hutner and Yaakov Ruderman);
BLEICH, supra note 57, at 347 n.56 (citing Rabbi Yaakov Kamenetsky); see also RABBI MENASHE
KLEIN, MISHNE HALACHOT VII:386; Joshua Kunin, Brain Death: Revisiting the Rabbinic Opin-
ions in Light of Current Medical Knowledge, 38 TRADITION 4, 48-62 (2004); Herschel Schachter,
Determining Death, 17 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. Soc'v 32, 40 (1989) (one must act strictly not
to remove organs from a person who is "brain dead"); Ahron Soloveichik, Death According to
the Halacha, 17 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. Soc'v 41 (1989). The position of Rabbi Moshe Fein-
stein is the subject of debate. See, e.g., BLEICH, supra note 77, at 171-76; BLEICH, supra note 57,
at 343-50. Although there is also some question regarding the position of Rabbi Joseph
Soloveitchik, Bleich counts him as one of the authorities who refused to accept the brain death
standard. BLEICH, supra note 77, at 176-77.
79. For example, the former Chief Rabbi of the British Commonwealth, Immanuel
Jakobovits, is another who did not endorse the brain death standard. See 2 HERRING, supra note
3, at 127.
80. See, e.g., 2 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 187; Yitzchok A. Breitowitz, What Does Halachah
Say About Organ Donation?, JEWISH ACTION (2003).
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This is not the place to evaluate the contrary Jewish law perspective
view that would permit transplant surgeries on patients who are de-
clared to be brain dead.8' As mentioned in the Introduction to this
Article, Jewish law currently lacks any institution authorized to defini-
tively resolve such disputes.82 Instead, individual Jews are bound by
the rulings of the authorities whom they regard as authoritative. 83 For
the large numbers of religiously observant Jews who follow the views
of authorities who find the brain death standards inadequate, sur-
geries on such patients are forbidden, falling within the scope of the
Jewish law prohibition against murder.84
It is not only Jewish law authorities who question or reject the brain
death approach. 85 Indeed, the development of the brain death crite-
ria is a relatively recent innovation and reflects a sharp break from
past practices that regarded patients as alive as long as their hearts
81. See, e.g., Fred Rosner & Moshe David Tendler, Definition of Death in Judaism, 17 J. HA-
LACHA & CONTEMP. Soc'Y 14 (1989) (arguing that brain stem death is death under Jewish law).
See generally 2 HERRING, supra note 3, at 99-105; Breitowitz, supra note 41.
82. See supra note 1. See also Yitzchok A. Breitowitz, How a Rabbi Decides a Medical Hala-
cha Issue, http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/decide.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). Rabbi Breitowitz
explained:
When there is a supreme body like the 70-member Sanhedrin [the Sanhedrin ha-
Gadol], their [sic] decision (by a majority) would be binding and preclusive on the
minority dissenters but in the absence of such an authoritative body (as is the case
today) there can be multiple halachic approaches.., with none of them being "wrong"
or "illegitimate."
Id.
83. Rabbi Hirsch wrote:
In all doubtful cases consult a scholar who, in virtue of his knowledge of the law and his
recognized conformity to it, is qualified to give a decision. If therefore you recognize
him on account of his knowledge and his character as a faithful exponent of the law,
follow his decision and turn aside neither to the right nor to the left ....
RABBI SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, HOREB: A PHILOSOPHY OF JEWISH LAWS AND OBSERVANCES
384 (I. Grunfeld trans., 4th ed. 1981). See also KAPLAN, supra note 4, at 244, 248, 256-57; Moshe
Sokol, Personal Autonomy and Religious Authority, in RABBINIC AUTHORITY AND PERSONAL
AUTONOMY 169, 209 (Moshe Z. Sokol ed., 1992); MISHNAH, Avot 1:6 ("Acquire for yourself a
teacher"); Breitowitz, supra note 82.
84. See supra notes 41, 77-80 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., M. Potts & D. W. Evans, Does It Matter That Organ Donors Are Not Dead?
Ethical and Policy Implications, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 406 (2005). Potts and Evans wrote:
In the last ten years, fresh attacks on brain death criteria have eroded their perceived
invulnerability. Their conceptual and empirical foundations are collapsing. Calixto
Machado and Alan Shewmon, in a newly published anthology, note that there are still
worldwide controversies over the very concept of human death and the putative neuro-
logical grounds for diagnosing it ....
Id. See also Paul A. Byrne & George M. Rinkowski, Abstract, "Brain Death" Is False, 15 ISSUES
L. & MED. 107 (1999); Nicholas Tonti-Filippini, Abstract, Revising Brain Death: Cultural Imperi-
alism?, 14 ISSUES L. & MED. 225 (1998).
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continued to beat.86 Nor was the brain death definition justified by
any novel medical insights or discoveries. 87 Instead, in 1968, brain
death was offered as a "new criterion" by an Ad Hoc Committee of
the Harvard University Medical School, which admitted to being
driven by practical concerns regarding (1) the ongoing grief of the
families of patients in an irreversible coma; (2) the need to free up
beds in intensive care units; and (3) the removal of obstacles to the
obtaining of organs for transplantation. 88 The committee proposed to
define as dead anyone in a state of "irreversible . . . coma [with] no
discernible central nervous system activity."' 89 This proposal led to the
promulgation of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA)
in 1980, which provides, among other things, that anyone who has suf-
fered "irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, includ-
ing the brain stem, is dead." 90 This standard seems to have been
adopted, either by statute or by judicial opinions, throughout the
United States.91
Some explicitly or implicitly criticize the application of the UDDA
standard as a disingenuous effort to define live patients as dead to
enable physicians to "harvest" organs without having to face criminal
liability for having murdered the patients from whom they were
taken. 92 Interestingly, the proposal of defining people as dead upon
86. See, e.g., D. Alan Shewmon, "Brainstem Death," "Brain Death" and Death: A Critical Re-
Evaluation of the Purported Equivalence, 14 ISSUES L. MED. 125, 142 (1998). Shewmon stated:
In summary, the notion of "brain death" as bodily death turns out to be logically and
physiologically incoherent. Historically, the introducers of "brain death" intended a
radical redefinition of death in terms of loss of personhood by virtue of permanent
unconsciousness, for the purely utilitarian purposes of turning off ventilators and [com-
mencing] organ transplantation.
87. Marie-Andree Jacob, Book Review, 26 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 165 (2003)
(reviewing MARGARET LOCK, TWICE DEAD: ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND THE REINVENTION OF
DEATH (2002)) ("The 'new' brain death was crafted in North America in the middle of the
twentieth century as a means to achieve an end: maximizing post-mortem organ procurement.
Thus it is at its core a utilitarian death. Peter Singer, for example, has pronounced it a 'conve-
nient fiction."').
88. A Definition of an Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 85 (1968). French investigators first
described the clinical criteria of "brain death" in 1959. Nevertheless, they did not allege that
brain death is the same as actual death. See K.G. Karakatsanis & J.N. Tsanakas, A Critique on
the Concept of "Brain Death," 18 ISSUES L. & MED. 127 (2002).
89. A Definition of an Irreversible Coma, supra note 88.
90. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH AcT § 1 (1980).
91. Breitowitz, supra note 41.
92. Consider, for example, the comments of Dr. Norman Fost, Director of the University of
Wisconsin's Program in Medical Ethics:
The notion of brain death, Dr. Fost said, was concocted about 20 years ago by medi-
cal specialists who wanted to increase the supply of organs for transplants. "They said,
'Let's have a statute saying a person is dead when the brain is gone so we can take the
heart out and not be accused of killing anybody,"' he said.
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the irreversible cessation of their entire brains, including their brain
stems, was predicated upon the assumption that those who satisfied
this criteria would inevitably cease breathing-and die-within an ex-
tremely limited period of time, certainly no longer than several days. 93
Yet a subsequent study by a former proponent of the brain death stan-
dard94 contradicts this assumption.95 The study evidenced approxi-
mately 175 cases of brain death with survival of at least one week,
eighty of whom survived at least two weeks, approximately forty-four
of whom lasted at least four weeks, about twenty at least two months,
and seven at least six months.96 One brain dead patient was still alive
after fourteen and one half years. 97 These findings are especially
noteworthy because the strongest of the brain dead patients may well
have been used as organ donors. There is no way of ascertaining how
long they might have lived had their treatment been continued. In-
deed, as the study's author remarked, "BD [brain death] is nearly al-
ways a self-fulfilling prophesy of somatic demise through organ
harvesting or discontinuation of support. ' '98
Even if the "irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain, including the brain stem" were to constitute death, a proposi-
tion with which Jewish law does not necessarily agree, the tests used to
determine whether there has been such cessation simply do not do
work. Robert Truog, for instance, stated:
[T]here is evidence that many individuals who fulfill all of the tests
for brain death do not have the "permanent cessation of functioning
of the entire brain." In particular, many of these individuals retain
clear evidence of integrated brain function at the level of the brain-
stem and midbrain, and may have evidence of cortical function. 99
Citing various studies, Truog commented, "This evidence points to the
conclusion that there is a significant disparity between the standard
Gina Kolata, When Death Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1997, § 4, at 1. See 2 ABRAHAM, supra
note 6, at 307 (citing this view); Norman Fost, Reconsidering the Dead Donor Rule: Is It Impor-
tant That Organ Donors Be Dead?, 14 KENNEDY INST. ETiIcs J. 249 (2004). See also MICHAEL
H. SHAPIRO ET AL., BIOETHICS AND LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 943 (2d ed. 1981)
("Most commentators agree that the desire to facilitate organ transplantation was the primary
force moving the Committee.").
93. This assumption is certainly a strange one in which to ground a definition of death. In
Jewish law, of course, the fact that a person will surely die soon would hardly be a reason to
define the person as dead now.
94. See Shewmon, supra note 86, at 126 (discussing his change of position).
95. Id. at 135; see D. Alan Shewmon, Chronic "Brain Death": Meta-Analysis and Conceptual
Consequences, 15 NEUROLOGY 1538 (1998); see also Kunin, supra note 78, at 51-54.
96. Shewmon, supra note 95, at 1540.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1542.
99. Truog, supra note 75, at 29.
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tests used to make the diagnosis of brain death and the criterion these
tests are purported to fulfill." 100  In their 2002 article, Doctors
Karakatsanis and Tsanakas not only asserted that the brain death con-
cept is "based on an unproved hypothesis," but cited extensive evi-
dence proving that the brains of patients declared to be brain dead
continued to function.101
Also citing such evidence, Rabbi J. David Bleich, a professor at
Cardozo School of Law, characterized the brain death definition as a
"semantic sleight of hand."'01 2 He compared it to similarly suggested
"definitions" that would have permitted the killing of the unwanted
young:
Some time ago, an eminent scientist and Nobel laureate, Dr.
James Watson, made the startling proposal that "birth" be defined
not as parturition or emergence of the baby from the womb, but as
occurring some seventy-two hours after this event. Consequently, if
a baby is not yet "born" and is found to be physically or mentally
defective, it could be destroyed with impunity up to the moment of
"birth." As a result of lexicographical sleight of hand, infanticide
within seventy-two hours of parturition would be relabeled as feti-
cide; since abortion no longer carries with it opprobrium, unwanted
babies could be readily (and morally) disposed of in this manner.
In a similar vein, England's Nobel Prize-winning biologist, Dr.
Francis Crick, has advocated legislation under which newborn ba-
bies would not be considered legally alive until they are two days
old and certified as healthy by medical examiners. Michael Tooley,
100. Id. at 30. This conclusion is especially persuasive as it comes from a person who actually
favors promoting the procurement of organs. He suggests that, on policy grounds, we allow the
taking of the needed organs from patients who are in an irreversible coma even though they are
still alive. Indeed, he recognizes that "[t]he most difficult challenge for [his] ... proposal would
be to gain acceptance of the view that killing may sometimes be a justifiable necessity for procur-
ing transplantable organs." Id. at 36. As discussed in Part II, Jewish law would not permit killing
even a person who has only a moment of life left in order to save someone who seems likely to
live many years.
101. Karakatsanis & Tsanakas, supra note 88, at 140-41. See also PETER SINGER, RETHINK-
ING LIFE AND DEATH (1994). Singer has written:
We think of the brain primarily as concerned with processing information through the
senses and the nervous system, but the brain has other functions as well. One of these
is to supply various hormones that help to regulate several bodily functions (for exam-
ple, the antidiuretic hormone ... ). We now know that some of these hormones con-
tinue to be supplied by the brains of most patients who, by the standard tests, are brain
dead. Moreover, when brain-dead patients are cut open, in order to remove organs,
their blood pressure may rise and their heartbeat quicken. These reactions mean that
the brain is still carrying out some of its functions, regulating the responses of the body
in various ways. As a result, the legal definition of brain death, and current medical
practice in certifying brain-dead people as dead, have come apart.
Id. at 36.
102. J. David Bleich, Moral Debate and Semantic Sleight of Hand, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1173, 1193 (1993).
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professor of philosophy at Stanford University, would grant even
greater latitude. He argues that human babies, even after birth, are
no more than kittens and cannot bear rights until they have aware-
ness of themselves as persons. Accordingly, he finds no reason to
view with disapprobation the killing of any child within the first two
weeks of life.103
B. May Precious Body Parts Be Bought and Sold?
The Jewish law duty to rescue not only permits but encourages
someone to donate a body part if doing so is necessary to save another
person's life and will not seriously endanger the donor's own life.10 4
Similarly, Jewish law would encourage the use of a cadaver's body
parts, at least if the deceased had previously consented, if necessary to
save a person's life. 10 5 Nevertheless, it would not allow the removal of
vital organs from someone declared brain dead under secular law, so
long as he or she is still alive under Jewish law, because doing so
would kill the donor. 10 6
The next question is whether someone could sell or buy such body
parts. I will first consider organs originating from live donors and
then organs from cadavers.
1. Organs From Live Donors
There is no apparent rule that would prevent the donor from charg-
ing a reasonable price for donating a body part. Assume, for instance,
that a person were required to provide a body part in order to fulfill
the duty to rescue discussed in Part II. When necessary to save some-
one else's life, a rescuer must use up to all of his or her resources to
effectuate the rescue.10 7 Nevertheless, if the person rescued is finan-
cially able to do so, he or she must compensate the rescuer for the
resources so expended. 10 8 Presumably, such compensation should in-
clude both the rescuer's out-of-pocket expenses as well as physician
and hospital costs. 10 9 Whether such payment could specifically in-
clude a designated "price" for the body part may be subject to de-
103. Id. at 1192 (internal citations omitted).
104. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 41, 72-73, 77-80 and accompanying text.
107. 1 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 216-17; 2 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 345-46; 3 ABRAHAM,
supra note 6, at 313-17; Resnicoff, supra note 3, at 300-01.
108. 3 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 310 (citing various sources).
109. These expenses are necessary to provide the body parts required for the donee's rescue.
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bate.110 A number of authorities have indicated that they are similar
to other body materials, such as hair and blood, which can be sold."'
In any event, a live donor ought to be able to receive a negotiated
price for pain and suffering, and this could obviate the need for a dis-
tinct "line item" for the body part.112
If a person could charge for providing a body part, the recipient
could surely pay to receive it. But suppose that Jewish law would not
permit a donor to charge. Could the person who needs the body part
still agree to pay for it? Ordinarily, it is forbidden for one Jew to
cause, or even to assist, another Jew to violate Jewish law.113 Paying
someone who is not permitted to receive payment would seem to vio-
late this ban. Nevertheless, if a person needs the body part in order to
save his or her life, the importance of saving that life, including one's
own, trumps this prohibition.1 14
Of course, the commercialization of body parts presents a plethora
of potential problems ranging from the clearly criminal to the tragi-
cally exploitative. Indeed, such commercialization exists today in
many parts of the world amidst reports of myriad alleged abuses.115
Would Jewish law permit such commercialization in light of the socie-
tal ills it might produce? Or, given the dangers such commercializa-
tion poses to the general public, would Jewish law prohibit the sale of
life-preserving body parts even though some people need those body
110. See, e.g., Yisroel Meir Lau (b. 1937), The Sale of Body Parts for Transplantation, 18
TEHUMIN 135 (exploring the extent to which a person "owns" a body part and has standing to
sell it).
111. See generally FRED ROSNER, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS AND JEWISH LAW 347-54 (2001) (cit-
ing various authorities); 3 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 270-74. Abraham has written:
[A]n organ donor who not only puts himself into danger (albeit small) but actually
gives the recipient a part of his body; surely he can ask whatever price he wishes. And
the patient who had no other choice will certainly be obliged to pay him the price that
was agreed upon.
3 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 271.
112. See, e.g., Lau, supra note 110. See also ROSNER, supra note 111, at 350.
113. See Resnicoff, supra note 73, at 192.
114. See 2 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 73-74 (one can commit a transgression not involving
idolatry, murder, or sexual immorality in order to save one's life).
115. See, e.g., Tom Hays, Funeral Parlour Scam: Body Parts Carved Up in Back Rooms, Sold
to Tissue Bank for Use by Americans, Canadians, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Dec. 24, 2005, at A12,
available at 2005 WLNR 20885997; Kathryn Knight, The Child Sold for His Organs, DAILY
MAIL, Feb. 26, 2005, 46, available at 2005 WLNR 2964660; Daniel McLaughlin, Bulgarian Hospi-
tal Faces Inquiry Over Alleged Sale of Organs, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, at 8, available at 2006
WLNR 448144; Nina Muslim, National Plans to Sell Vital Organs to Pay Off Debts, GULF NEWS,
Oct. 29, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 17518057 (discussing black market sales in various coun-
tries by the financially impoverished); Larry Rohter, The Organ Trade: A Global Black Market;
Tracking the Sale of a Kidney on a Path of Poverty and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at 11.
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parts to stay alive? How does Jewish law respond to such "policy"
considerations?
Traditionally, Jewish law responds to such considerations through
its legitimate leadership, which may promulgate decrees prohibiting
conduct that would otherwise be permissible-or even required-by
Jewish law. 116 Contemporary Jewish communities, however, lack the
well-defined, coherent political and juridical autonomy necessary to
produce leaders with sufficiently recognized authority to legislate on
such matters.117 Nevertheless, there is at least one historical event
that suggests that if such an authority did exist today, it might not
prohibit someone from trying to save his or her own life by purchasing
a body part.
This historical case was a judicial response to kidnappers. There is a
special Jewish law obligation to ransom a Jewish captive. 118 Perhaps
as a result, kidnappers in ancient times discovered that by seizing Jews
they could often extort a greater ransom than if they had kidnapped a
non-Jew. This encouraged them to target Jews. 119 The problem be-
came so severe that, in order to deter such activity, the sages issued a
decree that forbade people from ransoming anyone for more than "his
worth, '120 generally understood as the value the person would fetch if
sold as a slave. Nevertheless, even in this case, the sages permitted
someone who was a captive to ransom himself or herself at any
price.1 21 Furthermore, Jewish law authorities disagree as to whether
the prohibition applies at all in situations in which a captive's life,
rather than merely his or her liberty, is threatened. 122 Based on this
precedent, even if there were a universally recognized Jewish law au-
thority today, it might well be quite reluctant to order a person not to
purchase body parts to save his or her life. Moreover, any public pol-
116. R. YOSEF CARO (1488-1575), BEIT YOSEF, Yoreh De'ah 342; SHAKH, supra note 52,
Yoreh De'ah 342, sif koton 4.
117. See generally Jonathan Cohen, Halakhic Issues: Survey, in MODERN JUDAISM: AN OX-
FORD GUIDE 341-51 (Nicholas de Lange & Miri Freud-Kandel eds., 2005).
118. SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh De'ah 252.
119. See Alfred Cohen, Ransom or Exchange of Prisoners, 46 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP.
Soc'Y 61 (2003).
120. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gittin 45a; SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh De'ah 252:4. There are
certain exceptions. Id.
121. Id.
122. See EISENSTADT, supra note 15, Yoreh De'ah 252, sifkoton 4; Tosafot, Gittin 58a, s.v., kol;
See also Cohen, supra note 117, at 68.
[Vol. 55:851
A JEWISH LAW PERSPECTIVE
icy harms from the commercialization of body parts might well be out-
weighed by the public policy gains, including the saving of lives. 123
2. Organs From Cadaveric Sources
As explained, according to most authorities, where there would oth-
erwise be a conflict, the Jewish law obligation to save life trumps the
various prohibitions which might prohibit transfers from those who, as
a matter of Jewish law, are truly deceased. 124 Nevertheless, where
there is no such conflict, those prohibitions still apply. 125 Thus, al-
though the prohibition against benefitting from a cadaver does not
prevent a person from using it to save someone's life, the prohibition
would preclude someone from making a profit by selling the body
part. 126 A charge to cover one's expenses, however, would be permit-
ted.127 Moreover, if the person providing the body part is unwilling to
do so unless he or she receives a high price, the person who needs the
body part could pay the price demanded.1 28
IV. PREFERENCES FOR THOSE WHO VOLUNTEER AS DONORS?
Body parts that can be effectively transplanted are a scarce re-
source. Some commentators have proposed that secular authorities
provide a preferred status for those who themselves have volunteered
to be organ donors.'2 9 I will not compare this proposal to Jewish law's
own rules regarding the allocation of scarce resources.13 0 Nor will we
explore the constitutional or statutory soundness of such a proposal or
even whether the proposal would have the salutary impact predicted.
Instead, I will attempt to examine the "fairness" of this proposal in
light of prior discussion. Unfortunately, given time and space con-
straints, even this discussion will be relatively cursory.
123. See, e.g., Gary Becker, A Modest Proposal: How Much for That Kidney in the Window? A
Free Market in the Sale of Human Body Parts Could Save Thousands of Lives, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2006, at B3.
124. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. See also J. DAVID BLEICH, BIOETHICAL
DILEMMAS: A JEWISH PERSPECTIVE 67 (1998).
125. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
126. if, however, the money so paid is to be used to save the life ot another person, receipt of
the payment is permitted. See ROSNER, supra note 111, at 351.
127. Jewish law prohibits benefitting from the cadaver; simple receipt of reimbursement for
expenses does not constitute a "benefit."
128. ROSNER, supra note 111.
129. See, e.g., Mark S. Nadel & Carolina A. Nadel, Using Reciprocity to Motivate Organ Do-
nations, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 293, 294 (2005).
130. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 181-87; Fred Rosner, The Rationing of Medical
Care: The Jewish View, 6 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y 21 (1983).
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In part, the proposal is to prefer those who have already donated
one of their organs, such as a kidney. Such a sacrifice, to save the life
of another person, is praiseworthy. To the extent that those who ob-
serve Jewish law have had the same opportunity as those who do not
observe Jewish law to donate organs during their lives, in a manner
permitted by Jewish law, the proposal appears to be fair.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of people who are waiting for organ
transplants have not previously donated organs. Instead, the thrust of
the proposal and its overwhelming impact would be to confer a prefer-
ence on those people who have volunteered to "donate" organs upon
their demise. Moreover, given the extent to which the demand for
organs far exceeds the supply, providing a preference to such people
might, in practice, exclude those who do not so volunteer. Of course,
if those who observe Jewish law have the same opportunity to volun-
teer as those who do not, then, once again, the proposal might seem
fair. In fact, however, those who observe Jewish law do not have the
same "opportunity" to volunteer to be cadaveric donors. Indeed, they
are not even effectively presented with the same choice. Why? The
choice is whether to agree to allow one's organs to be surgically re-
moved upon being defined under the secular brain death standard.
Those who do not observe Jewish law and who accept brain death as
"death" are simply asked to agree that their organs be used after their
death. Those who follow Jewish law and do not accept brain death as
"death," however, are asked to agree that surgeons be allowed to sur-
gically remove their organs while they are still alive-and, thereby,
kill them. Moreover, although contributing one's organs after death
may not offend a person's religious scruples, contributing one's organs
while still alive under Jewish law-even though characterized as being
brain dead under secular law-constitutes dereliction of the duty to
preserve one's life and improperly enables, or assists, the operating
surgeons to violate the Jewish law against murder.131 Consequently,
agreeing to such contributions is religiously forbidden. As a result,
providing a preference for those who agree to being cadaveric do-
nors-under the prevailing secular brain death standard-is pro-
foundly unfair.
131. It would not matter whether the surgeon was Jewish. Under Jewish law, the prohibition
against murder applies to the killing of both Jews and non-Jews. See, e.g., MAIMONIDES,
MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Melakhim 9:4; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 57. Consequently,
if a Jew authorizes a surgeon to kill him or her by taking his or her organs, the Jew has wrong-
fully enabled the surgeon to transgress the law against murder. See generally Resnicoff, supra
note 3, at 324-37.
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Of course, some body parts, such as corneas, can be useful even if
physicians wait until the donor is dead, even as a matter of Jewish law.
A system that would provide preferences to Jews who agree to donate
such body parts once they are dead as a matter of Jewish law would be
less objectionable. Even such a system, however, ought to account for
the fact that Jewish law only allows cadaveric organ donations to the
extent necessary to save life. Cadaveric donations for purposes of
general medical research, for instance, are not permitted. 132 Conse-
quently, Jews should be entitled to a preference even if their consent
were restricted to life-preserving transplantations. Any other system
would demand more from Jews-violation of their religious law-
than from non-Jews.
Interestingly, two proponents of the preference system assert that
"[r]eligions that forbid organ donations would seem, almost necessa-
rily, to reject organ transplantation generally, and thus their believers
would not desire organs at all, certainly not a preference over others
who had chosen not to donate. 1 33 Perhaps some religions forbid all
organ donations, and perhaps this statement is true as to them. But
those proponents offered no proof for their claim. Judaism has a
nuanced approach to organ donations. Thus, while Jewish law permits
some donations, it requires a person to preserve his or her life134 and,
therefore, it does not allow a person to permit himself or herself to be
cannibalized while still alive. Similarly, Jewish law would not permit a
doctor to participate in surgery that would "harvest" such organs be-
cause this would violate the Jewish prohibition against murder.135 Nor
would it permit a person, even a person who needs an organ to save
his or her life, to persuade a "donor" to agree to the operation or to
persuade a doctor to perform it.136 Nevertheless, Jewish law would
permit a person-Jewish or non-Jewish-to accept such organs if they
have already been harvested. 137
132. The prohibition against mistreating a cadaver, see supra note 37, is biblical in nature and
can only be pushed aside for a serious purpose, such as prolonging the life of a particular person,
and not for the speculative benefit that might arise from research. See 2 HERRING, supra note 3,
at 106-07.
133. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 129, at 324.
134. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
136. See Resnicoff, supra note 3, at 335-37, 346-47. One may not cause someone else to
violate the prohibition against murder even in an attempt to save one's own life. See 2 ABRA-
HAM, supra note 6, at 307-08; Resnicoff, supra note 73, at 201-22.
137. See, e.g., 2 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 316; Soloveichik, supra note 78, at 45-47. The
position of Jewish law in this scenario is similar to its position allowing the use of valuable data,
if any, from Nazi medical experimentation on Jewish victims. The past evil is a fait accompli; the
important challenge in the present is to save human life. See BLEICH, supra note 57, at 223, 231,
233.
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To appreciate this rule, consider the following case. Suppose Alex
desperately needs a kidney transplant and he is on a list of prospective
recipients. Bob and Carl have an argument, and Bob hits Carl on the
head with a blunt instrument. When Carl arrives at the hospital, he is
declared brain dead. Yet, as explained above, Jewish law may con-
sider Carl to still be alive. 138 Because Carl had previously signed a
donor card, the hospital operates and takes Carl's kidneys (and cer-
tain other organs), which are now available for transplantation. May
Alex accept one of the kidneys? Under Jewish law it was forbidden
for Bob to strike Carl. The fact that he did so is tragic, even though it
led to the kidney being made available. Under Jewish law, however,
the fact that the kidney became available in this tragic way is not a
reason why Alex should refuse the kidney and die. On the contrary,
Alex's duty to preserve his life139 obligates him to take the kidney.
Indeed, under Jewish law, it was a tragedy for the surgeons to take
Carl's kidney until Carl was definitely dead as a matter of Jewish law.
The fact that, as a matter of Jewish law, the surgeons may be guilty of
murder for operating as early as they did is still not a reason why Alex
should refuse the kidney and die. The list of prospective organ recipi-
ents is long and replete with people who do not observe Jewish law.
Carl's kidneys-and his other organs-would have been taken for
other recipients even if Alex had clearly announced in advance that he
would not accept those organs. Consequently, under Jewish law, Alex
did nothing wrong by registering as a recipient, and he did nothing
wrong by taking the kidney. On the contrary, by taking the kidney he
fulfilled his obligation to try to preserve his life. 140
V. CONCLUSION
The Jewish law emphasis on the sanctity of life permits, and may
even mandate, certain donations by those whose own lives will not
thereby be endangered. Nevertheless, it is this same principle that ab-
solutely forbids surgeries that would prematurely terminate the lives
of patients who, under Jewish law, are still alive. An allocation system
that would effectively deny Jews life-preserving organs because of the
importance they place on human life is unacceptable.
138. See, e.g., supra note 41 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
140. Breitowitz, supra note 41. But cf 2 ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 307-08 (as to registering
as a recipient in Israel).
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